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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Les transactions par Internet exigent une confiance considérable entre les intervenants anonymes. 
Pour minimiser les risques associés à des opérations anonymes, les responsables de plusieurs 
marchés en ligne ont mis en place des mécanismes de gestion de réputation différant en structure 
et fonctionnalité. Dans une série d’expériences, cette étude évalue l’impact de deux mécanismes 
relativement simples sur la confiance et la coopération dans un jeu de confiance répété entre 
étrangers. 
 
Transactions on online markets require a great deal of trust among anonymous trading partners. 
To mitigate some of the risks involved in anonymous transactions, several online market sites 
have  implemented  reputation  management  mechanisms  that  differ  in  structure  and  probably 
functionality. In a series of experiments, this study examines the impact of two simple reputation 
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1. Introduction 
 
Trust may play a critical role in the development of the Internet as a marketplace. 
For example, in the emerging world of business-to-business collaboration, successful 
collaborations require trust in their partners to behave ethically. A company that shares 
internal data such as sales reports, production schedules, product designs and logistical 
details with a supply-chain partner must trust the partner with that information. Other 
examples where trust plays a role are informal online markets where individuals may buy 
and sell a wide variety of goods and services. In these markets, single, isolated trades 
often take place between anonymous counterparts. There may be no opportunity for 
inspection of the item to be traded. Thus, each of the trading parties might be tempted to 
cheat. As a buyer of Beanie Babies at eBay (http://www.ebay.com), for example, I face 
some risk that the seller has not accurately described the condition of his Beanie Babies, 
will not pack them properly, or will not deliver them in a timely fashion. To manage this 
kind of risk several approaches have been proposed (see, for example, Kollock 1999, and 
Malaga 2001.) For example, third party escrow services could be used. They have the 
disadvantage, though, that they are time-consuming and costly (service charges). It is 
sometimes advised to reduce some of the risk related with online trading by frequent 
communication with the trading partner and by insisting on the revelation of enough 
information to make the trading partner identifiable. However, there seems to be little 
hope of actually tracking down a trading partner, given the opportunities to disguise 
identities due to, for example, free e -mail services. As a more powerful approach, many 
of the online market sites have developed reputation management systems that allow the 
trading parties to submit a rating of the counter party’s performance in a specific 
transaction, which will be made  available to all visitors of the site. A positive rating of 
my trading partner is likely to increase my trust in the performance of the counter party. 
EBay, for example, uses a reputation management system, called the Feedback 
Forum that allows participants in a transaction to rate each other with a “+1” for a 
positive comment, a “ -1” for a negative comment or a “0” for a neutral comment.
1 All 
ratings that an eBay user has received from other eBay users are summed up to build his 
                                                 
1 In addition to this rating, they may also leave a textual comment.  2
or her Feedback Rating number. This number is given in parenthesis after each seller or 
bidder’s name. A user who has 100 positive comments thus gets a Feedback Rating 
number of 100. However, another user with 150 positive and 50 negative comments 
would also receive 100. Any user whose Feedback rating number reaches –4 is suspended 
from participation. The Feedback Rating number is part of the user’s Feedback Profile. 
The full Feedback Profile can be obtained by clicking on the number. It contains the full 
list of textual comments and a summary table, which clearly identifies the most recent 
ratings and comments.
2  
In this paper, we examine the effect of two variants of a simple reputation 
management mechanism on trust and trustworthiness in an experiment based on the trust 
game introduced by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). In this game, trust is measured 
by the amount that one of two players, the  investing player, unilaterally invests by 
sending it to the other, the  trusted player. The trusted player receives three times the 
amount  invested and may then return some amount to the investing player. The amount 
he returns provides a measure of the trusted player’s trustworthiness.  
Our intuitive hypothesis is that the introduction of a rating system, in which the 
investing player rates t he other player’s trustworthiness, should increase both trust and 
trustworthiness. Kollock (1999) argues that reputation management systems lead to lower 
levels of fraud. He cites a 1997 eBay summer report stating that over 99.99 percent of 
eBay auctions w ere completed successfully. Kollock also argues that traders with 
negative reputations are selected out: not only does the software, as described above, 
prohibit their further trading but there also is a reluctance by other people to trade with 
them.  Due  to the fact that in our experiment, the two players are exogenously matched, 
the reluctance to trade can show only in a lower investment (trust) level. In our 
experimental study, besides examining effects on trust and trustworthiness, we 
investigate strategic aspects of rating and reputation building given the specific reputation 
management mechanism. One variant of this system manages short-run reputation while 
the other manages long-run reputation and we are interested in whether the long-run 
                                                 
2 Amazon (http://www.amazon.com) uses a different feedback system to rate sellers: “Any time you make a 
purchase from a seller at Amazon marketplace, Auctions, or zShops, you’re encouraged to rate the seller’s 
performance and leave a short comment. The average ratings accompany a seller’s name in every reference 
and appear as one to five stars, with five stars being the best.”  
  3
reputation m anagement mechanism is more effective than the short-run reputation 
management mechanism in increasing trust and trustworthiness. Dingledine, Freedman 
and Molnar (2001) for example observe a shortcoming of the full history, long-run 
reputation management mechanism used by eBay:  
 
“In the eBay case, a group of people engaged in auctions and behaved well. As a 
result, their trust ratings went up. Once their trust ratings were sufficiently high 
to engage in high-value deals, the group suddenly ‘turned evil and cashed out.’ 
That is, they used their reputations to start auctions for high-priced items, 
received payment for those items, and then disappeared, leaving dozens of eBay 
users holding the bag.”   
 
A related question with respect to the long-run reputation management 
mechanism to be addressed in our study is whether it financially pays to build up a 
positive reputation. The results of empirical eBay studies suggest that buyers are willing 
to pay more for a good coming from a highly rated seller. Kalyanam and McIntyre 
(2001), for example, find in their study on eBay auctions of Palm Pilot personal digital 
assistants that reputation has significantly positive returns. Houser and Wooders (2000) 
also show that sellers in eBay auctions with a high reputation score receive higher bids 
than those with a lower score.  
Experimental and field studies are to be considered as important complements. In 
the experimental economics laboratory we have the advantage of being able to control the 
environment to a large extent at a relatively low cost. In our study we can, for example, 
directly compare the levels of trust and trustworthiness in an environment without any 
reputation management system to the levels of trust and trustworthiness in the same 
environment modified by the introduction of a specific rating system. Furthermore, we 
can compare the functionality of various rating systems.  
Our experimental design, thus, involves three treatments,  a baseline and two 
rating treatments. The baseline treatment is one in which participants repeatedly play the 
trust game, remaining in the role of either the investing player or the trusted player but 
interacting in each repetition with another unidentified participant. The latter implies that  4
strangers interact with each other. La Porta et al. (1997), for example, argue that trust is 
more essential to ensure cooperation between strangers than between partners who 
interact frequently and repeatedly. Among partners, reputation building and opportunities 
for future punishment could support cooperation even with low levels of trust. In our 
baseline treatment this kind of cooperation would be difficult to build up as reputation 
building and punishment could work only indirectly through an effect on the entire 
population. Our reputation treatments are similar to the baseline treatment: they also 
involve the interaction of strangers, but allow the investing player, at the end of each 
repetition, to rate the trustworthiness (cooperation) of the trusted player based on the 
amount returned. A player’s trustworthiness may be rated as positive, neutral or negative. 
The trusted player is informed about his rating.  In the long-run reputation treatment, the 
investing player is informed in the beginning of each repetition, before he makes his 
investment decision, about the most recent rating and the distribution of all previous 
ratings of his current trusted party. In the short-run reputation treatment he is informed 
of the most recent rating only. 
The following Section 2 presents some definitions of trust. In Section 3 we 
describe the game, previous experimental results and our experimental design in detail. 
The results of our experiments are presented in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the 
results and concludes the article with a discussion of their relevance in e -commerce and 
marketing. 
 
2. The role of trust, reputation and related concepts 
 
It is difficult to distinguish trust from related concepts, which on the surface 
resemble trust.  Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) argue that the most comprehensive 
definition of trust would be  taken-for-grantedness of the reality, implying that trust is 
considered a psychological mechanism for reducing complexity in the environment 
(Luhmann 1988). However, trust is typically assigned another role: trust provides a 
solution to the problem caused by  social uncertainty. Social uncertainty is defined to 
exist when I am incapable of correctly determining the intentions of other persons who 
have an incentive to act against my own best interest. We will thus limit our attention to  5
trust in other beings and organizations. Barber (1983) distinguishes between two types of 
trust, trust in another person’s competence and trust in another person’s goodwill. The 
former is the expectation of technically competent role performance from those involved 
with us in social relationships and systems, while the latter is the expectation that partners 
in interaction will carry their duties in certain situations to place others’ interests before 
their own. Yamagishi and Yamagishi suggest denoting the expectation of competency as 
confidence, and to define trust as the expectation of goodwill and benign intent. They 
further distinguish between trust and  assurance, where they define assurance as the 
expectation of benign behavior for reasons other t han goodwill of the other person.  In 
other words, trust is based on the inference of the interaction of another person’s traits 
and intentions, whereas assurance is based on the knowledge of the incentive structure 
surrounding the relationship. They give a nice example: 
 
Suppose I have a special tie with the Mafia, and my trading partner knows this. I 
am certain that he will not cheat on me; he knows that if he does he will be 
quickly sent to a mortuary. My expectation of the partner’s “honesty” is based on 
the fact that acting “honestly” is in his own interest, not on the belief that he is a 
benevolent person. Here, assurance exists but no trust. (Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi 1994, p. 132) 
 
Note that in the trust game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) the amount 
sent by the investing player yields a measure of trust in the goodwill of the other player. 
However, when we extend the trust game by the introduction of a  rating mechanism, 
assurance will play some role. The investing player knows that, at least initially, the 
trusted player will want to build up a good reputation. Thus, we expect in the experiments 
with a reputation management system to observe higher investment levels than in the 
baseline experiments without such a mechanism. The difference in the  trust levels of the 
experiments with a reputation management system and the baseline experiment may be 
considered a measure for assurance. 
Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) discuss commitment as another concept distinct 
from trust and assurance. To solve the  problem of social uncertainty people form  6
mutually committed relations. This reduces social uncertainty and thus the need for trust. 
In a repeated prisoners’ dilemma situation, for example, it is possible to induce others to 
cooperate by the use of a tit-for-tat strategy (reciprocity) (see Axelrod 1984, Selten 
Mitzkewitz, and Uhlich 1997, Keser 2000). Commitment plays an important role in 
repeated trust games with partners, such as in Cochard, Van Phu, and Willinger (2000). 
Thus, the higher investment level in their experiment than in the previous one-shot 
experiments on the same game. 
Reputation may play two different roles in social interactions involving trust. The 
first role is informational. It makes the recipient of positive reputation information trust 
more. Trust has been defined above as an expectation that (potential) partners have 
goodwill in their dealings with us. We do not have perfect information about their 
intentions, which we have to infer from available information, as for example their 
reputation. The second role of reputation is a kind of sanctioning. The attribution of a 
negative reputation may work as a sanctioning mechanism to punish dishonest behavior. 
This makes the owner of reputation act in a more trustworthy way. 
 
3. The Experiments 
 
The experiments are based on the trust game, originally called investment game, 
presented by Berg, Dickhaut, and MacCabe (1995), which we discuss in the first 
subsection. In the second subsection, we present a brief summary of previous 
experimental results. To examine the impact of simple reputation management 
mechanisms among strangers in our experiments, we compare the results of two 
reputation treatments to those of a baseline treatment. The treatment design and 
organization of the experiments are presented in the third subsection.  
 
3.1 The trust game 
 
In the trust game there are two players. Let us call them player A and player B.  
Both players have an endowment of 10 Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). In a first 
stage of the game, player A has the opportunity to send part or all of his endowment to  7
player B, but he needs not send anything. Player B will receive three times this amount. 
Then, in the second stage, player B may return any amount between zero and the received 
amount to player A, but he need not return anything. Then the game is over. The profit of 
player A, in ECU, is 10 minus the amount he sent to player B plus the amount that player 
B returned to him. The profit of player B, in ECU, is 10 plus the amount received (i.e. 
three times the  amount that player A sent) minus the amount that player B returned to 
player A. 
The game-theoretical solution to this game can be found by backward induction 
(Selten 1965). In the  subgame perfect equilibrium solution player A sends nothing to 
player B, anticipating that the latter, being fully rational, would never return anything. 
Thus, each player remains with a profit equal to his initial endowment of 10 ECU. 
Obviously, this solution is socially inefficient: due to the tripling of the amount sent by 
the  A-player to the B -player, the two players can earn profits that sum up to 40 ECU if 
player A invests 10 ECU (his entire endowment), while the sum of their profits is only 20 
ECU in the subgame perfect equilibrium solution. 
 
3.2 Previous experimental results 
 
The seminal experiment by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) on a single play 
of the trust game shows, that participants in the role of the investing player do trust in the 
other player and invest positive amounts. The trusted players on the aggregate tend to 
return the amount that the other player invested.
3 These results contradict the game-
theoretical solution of the game of zero investment and a zero return (independently of 
the investment level). The experiment has been replicated by Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and 
Boeing (2000), Meidinger, Robin, and Ruffieux (1999), Croson and Buchan (1999), 
Buchan, Johnson, and Croson (2000), Buchan, Croson, and Dawes (2000), Willinger, 
Keser, Lohman, and Usunier et al. ( forthcoming). While the qualitative results in these 
other experiments are the same, the quantitative details have been shown to depend on 
gender and culture. Also Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997), Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and 
                                                 
3 Another result of this study is that the provision of social history, that is, the provision of information on 
the amounts invested and returned in previous experimental sessions, significantly increases investment and 
return in the current session.  8
Riedl (1993, 1998), Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, and Gächter (1998) report that 
participants in experiments, structurally similar to the trust game, often respond 
reciprocally when they receive a  gift.
4 For a nice and comprehensive survey of 
experimental trust games, see Chapter 3 on “Social Preferences in Dictator, Ultimatum, 
and Trust Games” of Colin Camerer’s forthcoming book on Behavioral Game Theory. 
In order to interpret the observed behavior as some other kind of economic 
equilibrium behavior
5, Bolle (1998) defines trust as the anticipation of reciprocating 
behavior. He reviews s everal experimental studies that examine this kind of trust, 
including the one by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), with the focus on the question 
of whether trust pays. That trust pays would present a minimal requirement for a game-
theoretic equilibrium. His answer is  yes, trust pays: the net value from trust is generally 
not inferior to the net value from mistrust, although it is often close to zero.  
In an experimental trust game where two partners interact repeatedly, Cochard, 
Van Phu, and Willinger (2000) observe higher levels of trust and reciprocity than in the 
one-shot game, except for the last round. Their interpretation is that some of the trusted 
players try to build up a reputation of being cooperative players in early rounds. 
 
3.3 Experimental design 
 
In the experiments we examine three different treatments. In the baseline 
treatment ten participants, five of them in the role of player A and five of them in the role 
of player B during the entire experiment, play twenty repetitions (called  periods) of the 
trust game. In each of the twenty repetitions the A -B pairs are re-matched such that the 
same A -B pair will never interact in two consecutive periods. The participants have 
complete information about the parameters and the rules of the game but they can never 
identify the other player. The subgame perfect equilibrium to the twenty-fold repetition 
of the trust game prescribes, for each repetition, that player A send nothing to player B 
                                                 
4 The research by Ernst Fehr and his co-authors reveals the potential of trust and reciprocity to enforce high 
effort levels in situations of incomplete employment contracts, where the firm offers a fixed wage and the 
worker has considerable discretion in determining his effort level. 
5 Note that the theories of inequality aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000) are, among others, motivated by the behavior observed in trust game experiments.   9
who would not return anything. This treatment might also be considered as consisting of 
twenty one-shot trust games. 
The reputation treatments are similar to the baseline treatment. However, in each 
period of the trust game, there is a third decision stage, in which player A rates, based on 
player B’s return, the  cooperation (or, trustworthiness) of the B -player with whom he 
currently interacts. If the A -player did not send anything to player B, the latter cannot 
return anything, and thus player A cannot rate his cooperation in that period. The rating 
can be positive, neutral, or negative. Player B is informed about the rating given to him 
by player A. Based on the information given to player A, we distinguish between the 
short-run reputation treatment and the long-run reputation treatment. In the latter, in the 
beginning of each repetition, player A is informed about (i) the distribution of previous 
ratings and (ii) the most recent rating of the B -player with whom he is going to interact in 
that repetition, while in the former player A is informed about the most recent  rating 
only. The subgame perfect equilibrium solution for both of these treatments is again for 
player A to invest nothing and for player B to return nothing, and rating never takes 
place.
6  
The experiments were run in November 2001 (baseline and long-run  reputation 
treatments) and in March 2002 (short-run reputation treatment) in the experimental 
economics laboratory of CIRANO and LUB. This laboratory has privacy conditions 
sufficient to assure that participants can not even discern whether other subjects  are idle 
or engaged in input: heavy curtains surround and eliminate visual observation, and a 
heavy carpet eliminates audible clues to activities. We ran twenty experimental sessions, 
each with ten participants. Thus a total of 200 subjects participated in the experiments. 
The participants were randomly recruited from a subject pool of students of several 
universities and the business school in Montreal. The language was French. Subject 
payment was on average $ CN 30.  
 
                                                 
6 Note that there also exist a large number of reputation building Nash equilibria in which player A sends 
positive amounts to player B. Player B, in turn, sends, at least in early repetitions of the game, positive 
amounts back to player A in order to build up a positive reputation. However, to specify such equilibria we 
would need some ad hoc assumptions specifying, for example, the rating behavior of the A-players.  
  10
We organized eight sessions of the baseline treatment and twelve sessions of each 
of the two reputation treatments. In the beginning of each session, instructions were 
distributed and read aloud (an English translation of the instructions for the reputation 
treatment is in the Appendix). Then several questions were presented on each subject’s 
computer screen to test the subject’s understanding of the instructions. Only when all 
participants had answered all of the questions correctly could the experiment start. At the 
end of the each experiment, each subject was paid in cash, depending on his or her payoff 
in the game multiplied by a conversion rate of seven Cents per payoff point. A show-up 




In the first part of this section, we focus on the comparison of the outcomes of the 
three treatments: A -players’ investments, B -players’ returns and the profit of each player 
type. In the second part of this section, we examine the influene of a B -layer’s reputation 
on the A -player’s investment, the A -players’ rating behavior and the profitability of 
building and maintaining a positive reputation. The non-parametric data analysis is based 
on SPSS 10.0 for windows (Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, and Mann-Whitney U-tests) and 
Siegel (1987,  Binomial  test). We always consider  two-tailed asymptotic significance 
levels, requiring a 10 percent significance level. The outcome of each session is 
considered as one independent observation. The tests are thus based on eight independent 
observations of the baseline treatment and twelve independent observations of each of the 
two reputation treatments. For the regression analysis we use Limdep 7.0. 
 




Table 1 presents the averages, standard deviations and medians of the investments 
by the A -players over all periods in each session of the three treatments. The median 
investments in the baseline, the short-run reputation and the long-run reputation  11
treatments are three, five, and seven ECUs, respectively. Comparing the average 
investments, we observe significantly higher investment levels in the reputation 
treatments (5.15 ECUs in the short-run reputation treatment and 6.05 ECUs in the long-
run reputation treatment) than in the baseline treatment where the average investment is 
3.91 ECUs (U-tests,  p =0.090 and p = 0.004, respectively). This implies a 32 percent 
increase in the short-run reputation treatment and a 55 percent increase in the long-run 
reputation treatment. The difference in the overall investment levels of the two reputation 
treatments is statistically not significant (p = 0.248) although Figure 1, which exhibits for 
each of the three treatments the development of investments over time, reveals that in 
each period the average investment in the long-run reputation treatment is higher than in 
the short-run reputation treatment. Furthermore, we observe a similar pattern in the 
beginning and toward the end of the game: during the first periods we observe an 
increasing trust level (trust needs, to some extent, to be built up), while the trust level 
decreases dramatically in the final periods (trust breaks down).
7 Thus we expect the 
difference of the two treatments to show more clearly in the intermediate phase of the 
game. Decomposing the twenty periods of interaction into quarters, that is, p eriods 1 -5, 
6-10, 11-15, and 16-20, we observe a significant difference in the average investments of 
the two reputation treatments in the third quarter (p = 0.061) while the difference in the 
other three quarters is not significant.  
For a rough examination of the evolution of investment over time, we compare 
average ECU investments in periods 1-10 to those in periods 11-20. They decrease from 
4.27 to 3.56 in the baseline treatment. This decline is statistically significant (Wilcoxon 
test, p = 0.05). In the reputation treatments there is no significant tendency for the 
average investment to decline, although we observe an overall decline from 5.37 to 4.94 
(p = 0.126) in the short-run reputation treatment and an overall decline from 6.14 to 5.96 
(p = 0.433)  in the long-run reputation treatment. Thus, only in the baseline treatment do 
investments by the A-players significantly tend to decline over time.
8  
                                                 
7 This is a typical end game effect: from the vast literature on public goods experiments, for example, we 
know that cooperation, actively established by the players in the beginning of their interaction, almost 
always breaks down toward the end (e.g., Keser and van Winden 2000). 
8 In each of the reputation treatments, the standard deviation significantly increases from periods 1-10 to 
periods 11-20 (Wilcoxon tests, p = 0.077 in the short-run reputation treatment and p = 0.002 in the long-run 
reputation treatment). The increase in the baseline treatment is statistically not significant (p = 0.123). The  12
Figure 2 shows the relative frequencies with which investments of zero, one, two, 
etc, up to ten ECUs were chosen on the aggregate over all periods in each of the three 
treatments. In the baseline treatment the mode is at zero ECU, while it is at ten ECUs in 
each of the reputation treatments. When we consider the choices in the first period only, 
we observe the mode at an investment of two ECUs both in the baseline and the short-run 
reputation treatment, while there are modes at investments of ten and five ECUs in the 
long-run reputation treatment. From the very first period on, the average investment is 
significantly higher in the long-run reputation treatment (5.03 ECUs) than in the baseline 
treatment (3.75 ECUs) (U-test, p = 0.056).  The first period investment level in the short-
run reputation treatment is 4.25 and significantly different neither from the one in the 
baseline treatment (p = 0.446) nor from the one in the long-run reputation treatment (p = 
0.173). When we consider the choices in the last period only, there is a clear mode at zero 
ECU in all treatments. In the reputation treatments we thus have  the typical end-game 




Table 2 shows the average ECU investment by the A -players, the tripled amount 
received by the B -players, the average absolute and relative a mount returned by the B -
players in each session of both treatments. We observe that the B -players in the 
reputation treatment return an average of 7.10 ECUs (short-run reputation) or 8.88 ECUs 
(long-run reputation), each of which is significantly higher than the amount of 3.81 ECUs 
returned on average in the baseline treatment (U–tests, p = 0.025 and p = 0.001, 
respectively).
9 Given that the B -players in the reputation treatment tend to receive more 
from the A -players than the B -players receive in the baseline treatment, this result is not 
surprising. Thus, we consider the returned percentage of the amount received ( relative 
return). The B -player’s relative return is 46 percent in the short-run reputation treatment 
                                                                                                                                                 
standard deviation in the long-run reputation treatment is significantly higher than in the baseline treatment 
(U-test, p = 0.031). The differences between the short- and long-run reputation treatments and between the 
short-run reputation and the baseline treatments are statistically not significant (p = 0.133 and p = 0.643, 
respectively).  
 
9 The difference in the returns of the short- and long-run reputation treatments is statistically not significant 
(p = 0.248).  13
and 49 percent in the long-run reputation t reatment, while it is only 32 percent in the 
baseline treatment.
10 The difference between each of the two reputation treatments and 
the baseline treatments is statistically significant (U-tests, p = 0.005 for the short-run 
reputation treatment and p = 0.002 for the long-run reputation treatment). Thus, the 
relative returns are significantly higher in the reputation treatments than in the baseline 
treatment. The overall difference in the two reputation treatments is statistically not 
significant (p = 0.248).  However, Figure 3, which shows the development of the relative 
returns in each of the treatments over time, suggests that end game behavior that appears 
in both reputation treatments and initial similarities might largely drive this result. Thus, 
we decompose the twenty periods of interaction into quarters, that is, periods 1-5, 6-10, 
11-15, and 16-20. We observe that in the intermediary two quarters the relative return is 
significantly higher in the long- than in the short-run reputation treatment (p = 0.073 and 
p = 0.015 for the second and the third quarter, respectively).
11  
On the aggregate, the B -players in the baseline experiment return about one third 
(32.46 percent) of the received amount. In other words, they return roughly the amount 
that was invested by the A -player, neither more nor less. Comparing the B -players’ 
average absolute returns to the average investments by the A -players, we find no 
significant difference (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.575). This is in keeping with the previous 
experimental results discussed in Section 3.2 above. In contrast to this, in the reputation 
treatments, the B -players return almost one half (46 percent in the short-run reputation 
treatment and 49 percent in the long-run reputation treatment) of the received amount. In 
other words, they return more than was invested by the A -players (138 and 147 percent, 
respectively). Comparing the B -players’ average absolute returns to the average 
investments by the A -players, we find a significant difference (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.006 
and p = 0.003, respectively).  
                                                 
10 This implies a 51 percent increase in the long-run reputation treatment and a 41 percent increase in the 
short-run reputation treatment. 
11 For a rough examination of the development of the relative returns over time, we compare the average 
relative returns in periods 1-10 to the average relative returns in periods 11-20. In none of the treatments do 
we observe a significant de- or increase (Wilcoxon tests).  
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Figure 4 exhibits the relative return for each investment level (from 1 to 10). The 
return of roughly a third in the baseline treatment and of roughly one half in the 




Table 3 exhibits the profits of players A and B in each session of each treatment. In 
all three treatments the B -players gain significantly higher profits than the A -players 
(Wilcoxon tests, p = 0.012 in the baseline treatment, and p = 0.002 in the reputation 
treatments).  
The A -players gain on average 9.90 ECUs per period in the baseline treatment and 
11.95 and 12.83 ECUs in the short- and long-run reputation treatments, respectively. The 
differences between the baseline treatment and each of the reputation treatments are 
statistically significant (U-tests, p = 0.004 and 0.001, respectively). Thus, A -players 
significantly profit from the introduction of the rating system, whether it is building long- 
or short-run reputations.  
The B -players’ average profit increases from 17.93 ECUs in the baseline treatment 
to 18.36 and 19.27 ECUs in the short- and long-run reputation treatments. However, the 
differences between the baseline treatment and each of the reputation treatments are 
statistically not significant (U-tests, p = 0.699 and p = 0.316, respectively). Thus, B -
players do not significantly profit from the introduction of the rating system. Note that 
this result, together with the previous observation that A -players gain significantly less 
than B -players but are better off with a rating system than without, implies more 
equitable profits of A- and B-players.  
Comparing the two reputation treatments, the A -players’ profits show no 
significant difference (U-tests, p = 0.106). Neither do the B-players’ profits (p = 0.386).  
For a rough examination of the development of the profits over time we compare 
the average profits in periods 1 -10 to the profits in periods 11-20. In none of the 
treatments do we observe a statistically significant de- or increase, neither for the A -
players nor for the B-players (Wilcoxon tests).  15
4.2 Rating and reputation building 
 
In the following we will analyze the effects of the B -player’s previous ratings on 
the A -player’s investment (Section 4.2.1), the rating criteria of the A -player (Section 
4.2.2), and whether the building up of a positive long-run reputation tends to positively 
affect a B-player’s profit (Section 4.2.3). 
 
4.2.1 Effect of B’s previous ratings on A’s investment 
 
In the first part of this  subsection we examine the impact of a B -player’s most 
recent rating on the A -player’s investment in both evaluation treatments. In the second 
part we analyze the effect that the distribution information of all previous ratings of a B -
player (the overall rating) had on the A -player’s investment in the long-run reputation 
treatment. In the third part we use regression analyses to jointly examine both effects. 
 
Most recent rating 
To evaluate the impact of the B -player’s  most recent rating on the A -player’s 
investment, consider Table 4. The average investment obviously increases with the most 
recent rating. In the long-run reputation treatment, considering the values for each 
independent group, we observe a significant increase from neutral to positive and a 
significant increase from negative to positive (Wilcoxon tests, p = 0.008). However, the 
increase from negative to neutral is not significant (p = 0.158). We conclude, thus, that 
the most recent rating is significantly important only when it is positive. In t he short-run 
reputation treatment, all increases are statistically significant (p = 0.023 from negative to 
neutral, p = 0.003 from neutral to positive, and p = 0.002 from negative to positive). 
 
Overall rating 
To examine, in the long-run reputation treatment, the impact of the distribution of the 
previous ratings let us, in an ad hoc way, map the distribution into a unique single-valued 
measure, called the  rating score. The mapping is not reversible as each rating score can  16
represent many potential distributions. The rating score is determined, similar to the eBay 
Feedback Rating number, by  
 
(i)  giving a value of  +1 to each positive rating, a value of  –1 to each negative 




(ii)  summing these numbers .  
 
In periods 2 to 20, we observe rating scores ranging from  –12 to 19. The Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient between the individual rating scores in each period and the 
respective average investments by the A players is 0.844 and thus significantly positive at 
the 1 percent level (ignoring that our observations are not strictly independent here). We 
conclude that the average investment significantly increases with the B -player’s rating 
score. 
Considering the average rating scores per session in periods 1 -10 and 11-20 we 
observe that 9 sessions with a positive average rating score in periods 1-10 increased their 
rating scores in periods 11-20, while one session with a negative average rating score in 
periods 1 -10 made it to a positive average rating score in periods 11-20. Only two 
sessions built up a (more) negative reputation over time: they had a negative rating sum 
in periods 1-10 that became more negative in periods 11-20. We conclude, that there is a 
significant increase in the rating score (Binomialtest, 5 percent level) 
In the following, we simplify the analysis even further by distinguishing simply 
between a positive, zero or negative sum. Recall that this is not the way in which the 
distribution of previous ratings was presented to the participants in our experiment. Table 
5 reveals the average investment contingent on the overall rating being positive, neutral, 
or negative. Again, we observe that the average investment increases with the overall 
rating increasing from negative to neutral and to positive. Considering the values for each 
independent group, we observe a significant increase from neutral to positive (Wilcoxon  17




The analysis so far suggests that both the overall and the most recent ratings tend 
to influence player A’s investment in the long-run reputation treatment. A regression 
analysis will provide us further evidence of the impact of the B -player’s ratings on the A-
player’s investment. Let us use a simple linear regression model to explain the investment 
Ini of A -player  i in period  t by a vector of explanatory variables  xit, the corresponding 
parameter vector b and a random variable eit: 
 
Init = b xit + eit 
 
The explanatory variables are defined in Table 6. The regression results for each of the 
three treatments are presented in Table 7. In all three treatments, we observe a 
significantly positive constant and a significantly positive influence of  LIn, the A -player’s 
investment in the preceding period, while the impact of  LRR, the B -player’s relative 
return in the previous period is insignificant. In the baseline treatment we additionally 
identify a significantly positive coefficient of  LIn*LRR, the crossed effect of the player’s 
own investment and the B -player’s relative return in the preceding period, and a 
significantly negative trend ( Period  effect). In the two evaluation treatments, the 
coefficient of the dummy variable  DnoLIn  is significantly positive, which implies that the 
A-player tends to make a positive investment after having invested zero in the preceding 
period. Furthermore, there is a significantly negative last period effect. In the long-run 
evaluation treatment we identify a significantly positive coefficient of  LIn*LRR, the 
crossed effect of the player’s own investment and the receiving B -player’s relative return 
in the preceding period, and a significantly negative trend ( Period  effect); both of these 
coefficients are insignificant in the short-run evaluation treatment. In the short-run 
evaluation treatment  RecentPo, the B -player’s positive evaluation in the preceding period 
has a significantly positive impact on the A -player’s investment, while  RecentNe, the B -
player’s negative evaluation in the preceding period has a significantly negative impact  18
on the A -player’s investment. It appears as if in the short-run evaluation treatment the A -
player’s are largely focused on whether the most recent evaluation of the B -player they 
are interacting with was positive or negative but they do not take so much account of  
their own previous experience regarding the relative returns they received from the B -
players (in particular, the variable  LIn*LRR). In the long-run evaluation treatment, of the 
most recent evaluation, only  RecentPo has a significantly positive impact, which is in 
keeping with the results of the non-parametric analysis presented above. A positive sum 
of previous evaluations  SumPo significantly increases while a negative sum of previous 
evaluations SumNe significantly decreases the A-player’s investment. 
 
4.2.2 Rating by the A-player 
 
For the following analysis let us define two potential norms of cooperation in the 
trust game, the equal split of the gross surplus or the equal split of the net surplus of the 
investment. Table 8 presents for each investment level (from 1 to 10 ECUs), how much 
player B should return (i) if he equally splits the amount he received (the gross surplus of 
investment) and (ii) if he equally splits the profit of both players (the  net surplus of 
investment). In the first case player B should return one-half of the amount he received, 
while in the latter case player B should return two-third of the amount he received. 
To examine how the A -players rated the B -players, based on the relative return they 
received, consider Table 9 for each independent session. On average over all sessions, A- 
players gave a negative/neutral/positive rating for a relative return of 25.04/50.79/61.76 
percent in the long-run reputation treatment and for a relative return of 20.91/49.56/61.96 
in the short-run reputation treatment. Thus, on the average, A -players gave a negative 
rating if they received less than one third of the amount that player B received or, in other 
terms, less than they invested. They  gave a positive rating if the B -player returned more 
than one half of what he received or, in other terms, if player B was more generous than 
splitting the gross surplus equally. They gave a neutral rating if the B -player returned 
about one half of what he received or, in other terms, if player B equally split the gross 
surplus.  
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4.2.3 Long-run reputation and profits 
 
Table 10 presents for each session of the long-run reputation treatment the sum of 
overall ratings in the beginning of the final period, and the average payoffs of the players 
in that session with an overall positive, neutral or negative rating. The comparison of the 
positively and negatively rated B -players shows no important difference. When we 
aggregate over all sessions the positively rated B -players make a higher profit than the 
negatively rated B -players: 39 of the 60 B -players have an overall positive rating, and 
their average per period profit is 19.29 ECUs; while 16 of the 60 B -players have an 
overall negative rating, and their average per period profit is 18.66 ECUs. However, in 
seven of the sessions the negatively rated B -players gain more than the positively rated 
B-payers, while the opposite is true in four of the sessions. This suggests an externality or 
session effect, implying a  positive correlation between the number of positively rated B -
players and the A -players’ investment level in a session. However, there is no statistically 
significant correlation between the sum of overall ratings of a session and the average 




5.1 Summary of the results 
 
•  The introduction of a reputation management system increases both the level of 
trust (investment) and the level of trustworthiness (returns), and thus the overall 
efficiency. Trust in the absence of a reputation management system does not yield 
net gains for the investing party, while it does so in the presence of a reputation 
management system. While in the absence of a reputation management system we 
observe a relatively low trust level that even tends to decrease over time and a 
continuously low level of trustworthiness, we observe continuously high levels of 
trust trustworthiness in the presence of a reputation management system. The 
introduction of a reputation management mechanism leads to a significant gain 
for the investing party but not for the trusted party. This implies more equitable  20
payoffs of the investing and the trusting party through the reputation management 
system. 
 
•  Short- and long-run reputation management systems show significant differences 
in their functionality in the intermediate phase of interaction: the long-run 
reputation management system leads to higher trust and trustworthiness than the 
short-run reputation management system. 
 
•  To receive a positive rating the trusted party needs to be more generous than 
sharing the gross surplus evenly. 
 
•  Both long- and short-run reputation tend to have an impact on the amount that 
will be sent to the trusted party. If the distribution of all previous ratings of the 
trusted party is available, its most recent rating has a significant impact on the 
amount invested by the trusting party only if the most recent rating is positive. 
 
•  The trusted parties care for their long-run reputation if it is at stake. 
 
•  It is not clear whether it individually pays for a trusted party to develop and 
maintain a positive reputation.  
 
5.2 Importance of the results and method for e-commerce 
 
We have built a framework that allows us to examine the performance of other 
reputation management mechanisms and compare it to the performance of the mechanism 
presented in this study. While our mechanism is similar to the one currently used by eBay 
it is different from the one-to-five star mechanism used by Amazon. 
 
Our conjecture is that reputation management systems will likely become more important 
in the future as the Internet develops as a market place. They clearly are a contributing 
factor to success, as we can see at sites such as eBay. Their existence and performance  21
can make a big difference in buyers’ satisfaction or firms’ profit and thus in their reliance 
on online markets. 
 
5.3 Other potential applications 
 
Other important applications of this research on reputation management 
mechanisms are in marketing. F or example, trust and reputation are at the heart of the 
discussion of buyer-seller relationships. Firms are increasingly concentrating on fewer 
but more intense relationships with their suppliers for their inputs and their channel 
members for distribution. This implies the adoption of cooperative systems such as 
electronic data interchange or joint marketing programs, which make the firms vulnerable 
to the opportunistic behavior by their partners. In a meta analysis, Geyskens, Steenkamp, 
and Kumar (1998) p rovide quantitative evidence that trust plays a crucial role in the 
building of cooperative marketing channels. They also show that whether trust develops 
depends on how parties feel and behave and on the realized outcomes. The production of 
trust through  reputation management systems also is an important issue for brand 
management. Using data from the market for red Bordeaux wines, Landon and Smith 
(1997) show that reputation (past quality) and collective reputation (average group 
quality) play a major role in consumers’ decision making. Their results also indicate that 
reputation has a strong impact on consumers’ willingness to pay. They conclude that “ 
[…] consumers place considerable value on mechanisms that dissiminate information on 
the past quality performance of firms.” (page 313).  Interestingly, “[…] consumers 
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Figure 4: Relative return (based on received amount) for investment levels 1 to 10  29
Table 1:  
Player A’s investment (average, standard deviation, median) 
 






















































































































































All  6.05  3.80  7 
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Table 2:  
Player B’s (relative) return 
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All  6.05  18.15    8.88  49.00 
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Table 3:  
Average profits per period 
 






















































































































All  12.83  19.27 
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Table 4:  
Average investment by the A-players depending on their corresponding B-player’s most 
recent rating 
 
Treatment  Most recent rating of 
B 























































Explanatory variables of econometric models 
 











A-player’s investment in the preceding period 
1 if A-player made zero investment in preceding period, 0 otherwise 
Relative return experienced by A-player in preceding period 
Crossed effect between LIn and LRR 
1 in last period of the game, 0 otherwise 
Period number 
1 if B-player’s most recent evaluation was positive, 0 otherwise 
1 if B-player’s most recent evaluation was negative, 0 otherwise 
1 if sum of B-player’s previous evaluations is positive, 0 otherwise 
1 if sum of B-player’s previous evaluations is negative, 0 otherwise  33
Table 7 



















































































2  0.42610  0.42661  0.52844  0.52829  0.37475  0.37539 
* significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level 
 
 
Table 8:  
Amounts in ECU to be returned by player B for  






Equal split of 
gross surplus 













































Table 9:  
Average relative return (in percent) for which the A-players gave a negative, neutral  
or positive rating 
 





















  7.71 






























































































Sum of overall ratings in the beginning of the final period, and the average per period 
payoffs [in ECUs] of the players in that session with an overall positive, neutral or 
negative rating 
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All    39  19.29  5  21.06  16  18.66 
* The negatively rated B-players gain more than the positively rated B-players 
 
 
 